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Introduction:		
 
Russia	in	the	Western	Balkans1	
 
In March of 2016, at the height of the migrant crisis in Western Europe, a European 
Council on Foreign Relations Policy brief suggested that the Western Balkans had become 
subject to increasing instability, and that amongst the factors threatening it, was the ‘return’ of 
great power politics (de Borja Lasheras, Tcherneva, & Wesslau, 2016). Although the region 
was the center much attention in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, throughout the past decade, most 
of the Western Balkans appear to have fallen to the backdrop of international political attention. 
However, due to a developing rhetoric of an increasing geopolitical standoff between Russia 
and NATO and the EU2, as of recent the Western Balkans, have increasingly acquired a ‘greater 
strategic resonance’. 
Although a completely different region from the era of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, the Western Balkans remain an extremely fragile and volatile region, 
struggling to proceed with democratization. For the past decade, the promise of EU 
membership for Western Balkan states managed to accelerate and promote substantial 
democratic reforms throughout the region. However, as domestic politics have increasingly 
prioritized frozen conflicts and issues of ethnicity, democratization processes have stagnated, 
with some states even starting to backslide towards more authoritarian forms of governance. 
Adding to this have been increasing suggestions of Russia’s renewed geopolitical interest in 
the Western Balkans, with some headlines suggesting it is looking to “stealthily [take] control 
of the Slav and Christian Orthodox parts of the region” (IISS, 2017). While such claims may 
be rather over-exaggerated and aimed at making headlines, in the context of increasing 
geopolitical competition between the two fronts, studying the Western Balkans has become of 
increased academic relevance. Although the relevance of this topic can be found in its topical 
nature, so far, comparatively little academic attention has been given to the role of external 
actors in the Balkans. While think tanks3 have increasingly paid attention to the role of Russia 
in the Western Balkans, it remains that few academically published works exist analyzing this 
topic4.  
                                                
1 The region consists of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo. 
2 Largely due to escalating tensions between Russia and NATO in Northern and Central Eastern Europe. 
3 Such as the IICC and ECFR, amongst several others. 
4 Two recent examples have the works of Blank & Kim, 2014; Nelaeva & Semenov, 2016. 
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 Often labelled as a ‘Black Knight’ or a ‘negative external actor’, Russia’s actions in 
Eastern European and Central Asian politics have often been perceived as being of malicious 
intent. While such a viewpoint can easily become subject to a bias, strong correlations often do 
exist between eastward manifestations of NATO and the EU, and sudden strengthening of 
Russian strategic interests in these respective areas. Whereas in its direct near abroad, the 
responses evoked have often been characterized by approaches more characteristic of ‘hard 
power’5, in the Western Balkans, Russia’s approach has been more resembling of soft-power6. 
As Western Balkans states have increasingly become subject to EU ‘enlargement fatigue’, and 
processes of democratic consolidation have slowed down, a political vacuum has been opened 
up in the region. Correspondingly, throughout Putin’s third term as president (2012-), Russia 
has increasingly strengthened relations with the Slav and Christian Orthodox parts of the 
region, while also establishing new linkages based on shared culture, religion, and economic 
ties.  
 Focusing on these developments, this thesis seeks to investigate the following question: 
to what extent has Russia capably established linkages in the Western Balkans, both historical 
and newly developed, allowing it to gain geopolitical influence in a region struggling to 
consolidate democracy and develop national identities? In order to find an answer to this 
question, the research has been divided into three chapters. The first chapter will provide 
theoretical considerations about the minimal conditions for democracy, hybrid regimes, as well 
as regarding the theory of linkage. Understanding these ideas will illustrate how inherently 
weak states are more prone to influences from external actors, providing the necessary 
framework for understanding how processes of democratization can either be stimulated or 
prevented by external actors of influence. The second chapter will be aimed at creating a better 
understanding of Russian foreign policy, specifically with regards to its strategic interests in 
the Western Balkans. Understanding Russian interests in the Western Balkans means gaining 
an understanding of its relationship with NATO and ‘the West’, as this relationship is 
fundamentally interlinked its interests in the region, as well as with the more general foreign 
policy approach taken under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. The third and final chapter will 
investigate Russian linkage in the Western Balkans, focusing specifically on Montenegro, 
Macedonia, and Republika Srpska (RS), one of two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while 
                                                
5 Such as the military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, and signs of election meddling in Moldova. 
6 Originally a term coined by Joseph Nye, 2004 
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furthermore providing conclusions about the extent to which these linkages have allowed 
Russia to exert leverage, or the ways in which it could do so in the future. 
While it is not the argument of this thesis that Russia is seeking to influence Western 
Balkan states at the cost of regional stability, it will argue that the increasing security threat 
posed to its own national interests by NATO and the EU have been the primary motivation for 
bolstering its efforts in the region. Fueled by the pronounced ‘fatigue’ of EU-enlargement, a 
window of opportunity has been opened in which it has increasingly exploited its favorable 
position with the Slavic and Eastern Orthodox communities of the Western Balkans. 
 
Methodology	and	Limitations	
 
As has become clear, in order to analyze the proposed research question, a cross-
comparative analysis will be made of three different cases within the Western Balkans. In order 
to provide a foundation for the ideas throughout this thesis, within chapter one several concepts 
are developed, aimed at providing a better understanding regarding regime classification, 
linkage, and the role of external actors in influencing regime outcome. The choice of these 
specific cases chosen arises out of a balance of similarities and differences between the cases. 
All three cases are at different stages in their respective paths towards EU and NATO 
integration, ranging from being integrated into NATO and in a more advanced state of 
negotiations regarding EU accession (Montenegro), to currently having little to no concrete 
plans existing for its integration (Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole). 
All three, however, share inherent weaknesses that have continued to trouble their paths 
towards democratization. Most significant of these issues has been a notable ethnic cleavage 
in each case, an important factor plays a role in Russia’s capability to reinforce historic linkages 
and foster new ones.  
While the topical nature of the research in itself can be regarded as an argument for the 
relevance of the study performed, it also provides a responsibility regarding the reaching of an 
impartial conclusion of developments at hand. With the significance of certain related ongoing 
events still unclear as of yet, the final section of chapter 3 seeks to address this dilemma by 
considering the wider significance of Russia’s increased actions, rather than conclusively 
saying it’s interests are only served via one mechanism. 
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CHAPTER	1	–	Theoretical	Considerations:	Classifying	Regimes,	Linkage,	
and	the	Promotion	of	Regime	Types	
 
Democracy	and	its	‘Minimal’	Qualifications	
 
Within the academic field of international relations, the understanding of regimes, and 
whether their political systems qualify as a ‘democracy’ or not, is a debate that has been 
ongoing and been developing continuously throughout recent years. While it is unlikely a 
consensus regarding the complete definition of democracy will ever be reached, in its most 
basic form, democracy means rule by the people. Modern political democracy functions as a 
“system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm 
by citizens” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 76). Elections therefore, have arguably become the 
most crucial component of democracies, as Samuel Huntington has noted that democracy can 
only exist when “its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, 
and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes”, and “virtually all the 
adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington, 1993, p. 7).  
However, as Huntington stresses, elections cannot be the only indicator of democracy; 
“governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, 
dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public 
good” (Huntington, 1993, p. 10). It is in this context that questions have arisen regarding the 
legitimacy of many of the vast amount of ‘democracies’ to have surfaced since the end of the 
Cold War. Throughout this time period, as Larry Diamond (2002, p. 22) notes, “more regimes 
than ever before [adopted] the form of electoral democracy, with regular, competitive, 
multiparty elections”, but in practice were failing “to meet the substantive test [of democracy], 
or [did] so only ambiguously” (Diamond, 2002, p. 22). From ideas such as these, within the 
literature on democracies, a new theme appeared. Literature began focusing on forming an 
understanding of regimes as being neither democratic nor authoritarian, thus moving beyond 
the more classical and binary definitions given by political scientists such as Samuel 
Huntington. 
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Understanding	Regimes:	The	Political	(Gray	Zone)	Spectrum	
 
As the dramatic rise of post-Cold War electoral democracies drastically slowed down 
by the end of the 1990’s, democratization literature began shifting its focus towards better 
understanding the nature of newly arisen democracies, looking at the reality of what happens 
“after the elections” (Zakaria, 1997, p. 23). With scholarly attention rising for analyzing “the 
varieties of nondemocratic regimes”, as well as for the “rather astonishing frequency with 
which contemporary authoritarian regimes manifest (…) a number of democratic features”, 
political scientists started writing about regimes that had come to exist in a theoretical ‘middle-
ground’ (Diamond, 2002, p. 23). Neither democratic nor autocratic, this middle ground is 
something which Thomas Carothers (2002) most notably has come to refer to as the ‘political 
gray zone’. Within it exists a spectrum inside which regimes can be placed either on one side 
(democracy) or another (autocracy), or in the middle.  
On one side of the spectrum, closest to Huntington’s (1993) ‘minimal democracy’, are 
the concepts of ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘transitional country’, and ‘semi-democracy’. Regimes 
found on this side of the spectrum have usually experienced a significant progression towards 
democratic consolidation, and as such, are treated by scholars as incomplete or transitional 
forms of democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 51). While states considered to be an ‘illiberal 
democracy’ or ‘transitional’ may retain “some attributes of democratic political life”7, they are 
generally stricken by serious democratic deficiencies8, and as such are more often than not 
incapable of becoming “well-functioning democracies”, no longer “deepening or advancing 
whatever democratic progress they have made” (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). If static in this 
condition, Larry Diamond (2008) has argued that the conditions characterizing illiberal 
democracies make them particularly susceptible to a ‘democratic rollback’; a situation in which 
states progress back towards authoritarianism, rather than completing their ‘transition’ to a 
liberal democracy.  
On the other side of the spectrum are regimes that exist as a ‘diminished form’ of 
authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010) have labelled such regimes as ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’: while they retain the basic premonition of democratic regimes9, competitive 
                                                
7 Such as “limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society”, as well as “regular 
elections and democratic constitutions” (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). 
8 Such as “poor representation of citizens’ interests”, “low levels of political participation beyond voting”, 
“frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy”, low levels of “public 
confidence in state institutions”, as well as “persistently poor institutional performance by the state” (Carothers, 
2002, pp. 9-10). 
9 The holding of elections. 
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authoritarian regimes are defined as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions 
exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power”, consisting of severe 
discrepancies in at “least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections (2) 
broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field” (Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 7). Similar to illiberal and transitional regimes, Levitsky and Way (2002, p. 51) argue 
that these will either “remain hybrid” or eventually move towards an increased state of 
authoritarianism.  
 
Linkage	Theory	
 
In order to better understand how external actors can influence the domestic politics of 
another state, it is imperative to understand the concept of linkage in international relations. 
Linkage politics, as an international relations theory, remained relatively unpopular during the 
Cold War era, given its limited explanatory capability. Early research in the field, associated 
with the works of James N. Rosenau (1969) and Arthur Stein (1980), focused on simple two 
by two relationships between states and their respective policies. Arthur Stein (1980, p. 62) 
specifically described linkage politics as “a state’s policy of making its course of action 
concerning a given issue contingent upon another state’s behavior in a different issue area”. 
Hereby, linkage is described as a form of game theory, analyzing the 2x2 relationship between 
two states. Linkage in this form is identified as an “obvious response” to a country’s own 
perceived “unbalanced or asymmetric decline” (Stein, 1980, p. 62). While the basic 
premonition made by Stein and Rosenau has remained valid, most significant of the works 
regarding linkage have been later works of Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2005; 2010), with 
their notions of linkage and leverage. 
Responding to the increasing academic attention for the role of external actors, Levitsky 
and Way’s work lead the way in dissecting the poorly understood “relationship between the 
post-Cold War international environment and regime outcomes” (Levitsky & Way, 2005, p. 
379). Linkage between one state and another is best defined as “the density” of economic, 
political, diplomatic, social, and organizational ties as well as “cross-border flows” of trade, 
investment, people and communication (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 23). These linkages are 
directed from an external actor towards a recipient state, and are needed in order to effectively 
provide leverage over the latter (Levitsky & Way, 2005). Leverage, most effective when in 
combination with linkage, primarily materializes in strategies “including political 
conditionality and punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and military intervention” (Levitsky 
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& Way, 2005, p. 21). Although their work predominantly focuses on the role of linkage in the 
promotion of democracy, later works have also utilized its ideas in identifying the influence of 
negative external actors. 
 
Promoting	Democracy	
 
Prior to understanding how states effectively promote illiberal regimes, it is imperative 
to briefly elaborate upon how, in the past, states have promoted liberal regimes. While it wasn’t 
until after the Cold War that democratization literature widely began focusing more widely on 
the idea of ‘democracy promotion’, philosophers as early as Emmanuel Kant had already 
suggested “that some of the causes of democracy [in fact] lie beyond a country’s borders” 
(Brinks & Coppedge, 2006, p. 463). More recent works such as Rustow’s ‘Transition to 
Democracy’ (1970), and perhaps most famously Huntington’s The Third Wave (1993) affirmed 
the idea that democratization is not conclusively a domestic process. Within the collection of 
literature to arise since the Cold War, general focus is on three points of external influence: the 
role of foreign aid, EU conditionality, and the diffusion of democracy.  
 In its most basic form, democracy promotion involves the “offering [of] moral, 
political, diplomatic, and financial support to individuals and organizations that are struggling 
to open up authoritarian regimes” (Diamond, 1992, p. 27). While this depicts an ambitious 
vision for what democracy promotion should be, the reality of democracy promotion in the 
1990’s and early 2000’s mainly consisted of foreign aid programs aimed at inciting or speeding 
up transition processes (Vanderhill, 2014, p. 257). Although early studies such as those led by 
Carothers (1999) and Burnell (2000) have pointed towards the potential of foreign aid in 
promoting democracy, they simultaneously warn against the challenges it faces when 
incorrectly implemented.  
 Arguably most effective in the promotion of democracy has been has been the role of 
EU conditionality. Focusing on Southern Europe, Laurence Whitehead (2001, p. 262) notes 
that the European Union has the capability to act “as a powerful catalyst both of 
democratization and of national redefinition”. As an external actor, the EU has particularly 
managed to exercise “tremendous influence on domestic politics” through upholding the 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ for neighborhood states seeking membership (Sedelmeier, 2010, p. 519), 
influencing the democratization process of post-Communist Europe (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). Within Southeastern Europe, EU conditionality, in 
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combination with the provision of foreign aid, has been upheld as one of the primary methods 
of ensuring the transition towards democracy. 
 A last focus has been on the concept of diffusion, which features a strong emphasis on 
how the “geographic spread of ideas, policies, and institutions from one country to another” 
can take place by means of “demonstration effects, diffusion through mimicry or imitation, or 
[through] modular action” (Vanderhill, 2013, p. 5; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Geography plays 
an extremely important role, and later works by Brinks and Coppedge (2006) and Berg-
Schlosser (2008) have specifically looked at how the EU and its geographic proximity to its 
‘European Neighborhood’ has resulted in the diffusion ideas towards these states.  
While the optimism of post-Cold War democratization resulted in a substantial amount 
of `literature regarding such processes, stagnating democratization processes and the rise of 
increasingly powerful regional authoritarian actors resulted in the rise of an academic interest 
for the external promotion of less liberal forms of governance (Bader, Grävingholt, & Kästner, 
2010, p. 84). As Jakob Tolstrup (2015, p. 674) has concluded, “external interventions need not 
only originate with democracy promoters attempting to weaken authoritarian rule”, instead, 
“equally often, actors from the outside play a crucial role in protecting and sustaining [and 
promoting] authoritarianism”.  
 
Countering	Democracy	Promotion,	Promoting	and	Diffusing	Authoritarianism	
 
 Within the relatively new field of study of the promotion of authoritarianism, literature 
largely identifies three mechanisms capable of changing a regime outcome. The first of these 
mechanisms, and arguably the earliest, has been an ‘emerging backlash’ against the promotion 
of democracy. In 2006, suggested Thomas Carothers (2006, p. 55) first suggested that a 
“disturbing trend” had developed; “after two decades of steady expansion of democracy-
building (…), a growing number of governments [were] starting to crack down on such 
activities within their borders”. Authors such as Thomas Ambrosio (2009) and Neil Babayan 
(2015) later identified similar processes, particularly concerning Russia within its near-abroad, 
aimed at a number of former-Soviet Republics. This ‘backlash’ was led by assertive 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states, whom employ a variety of measures10 aimed at 
countering the democracy promotion efforts. Analyzing Russia, Tolstrup (2009) has 
furthermore noted that external actors often prevent democracy through the external 
                                                
10 See Carothers, 2010, p. 59. 
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management of ‘instability’, in weak democratic states. Preventing stability means preventing 
states from further democratizing, and thus falling further out of their sphere of influence 
(Tolstrup, 2009, pp. 932-933). 
The second mechanism identified in authoritarianism literature has been the 
‘promotion’ of authoritarianism, an underdeveloped area of study thus far. First suggesting the 
idea in 2006 (p. 2), Peter Burnell (2010, p. 5) concluded in 2010 that the promotion of autocracy 
involved external actors seeking to move a given “political regime away from democracy and 
towards semi or fully authoritarian rule”, while attempting to “make the international 
environment more hospitable to authoritarian or would-be authoritarian rulers and regimes”. 
In her seminal piece Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad, Rachel Vanderhill (2013) echoes 
many of these ideas, arguing that mechanisms such as the ‘changing of elite capabilities’ and 
the influencing of civil society have been most influential in changing regime outcome. Despite 
the similarities, Vanderhill (2013, p. 13) notes that external efforts to promote authoritarianism 
“are not identical to those that promote democracy” given that, unlike democratic states, 
authoritarian states have greater freedom of action and are “not constrained by the norms of 
democracy at home or abroad”. 
The final mechanism identified has been the diffusion of authoritarianism within 
regions; a process similar to democratic diffusion. Regarding this topic, Thomas Ambrosio 
(2010, p. 375) noted that “rather than expecting the further spread of democracy, the potential 
for the diffusion of autocracy, or at least the diffusion of autocratic methods, looks increasingly 
likely”. Building on Larry Diamonds (2008) concept of ‘democratic rollback’, Ambrosio 
observed that autocratic diffusion materializes through “self-coups and a proliferation of 
methods which undermine liberalism and strengthen pre-existing regimes” (2010, p. 377). 
Autocratic values are not only easily spread within a region, but individual agents of influence 
can easily become lured by the potential gains made possible through a more autocratic state. 
Most susceptible to these processes, are states that are inherently weak. Authoritarian values 
and governance, when combined with pressure from external – anti-democratic – actors, can 
easily result in regressing democratic trajectories for institutionally weak states (Levitsky & 
Way, 2002, p. 61). 
CHAPTER	2	–	Russian	Foreign	Policy:	Moscow	and	Brussels	
 
Pragmatism	under	Putin:	Domestic	and	Foreign	Policy	
 
In order to better understand Russian interests in the Western Balkans, it is crucial to 
first better understand Russian foreign and domestic policy under Vladimir Putin. Taking 
control of an inherently complex political structure at the turn of the century, Putin was charged 
with solving the severe political and economic crisis troubling the still young Russian 
Federation left behind by the Yeltsin administration. Throughout Yeltsin’s time, the state had 
become “overgrown with powerful regional, oligarchic, bureaucratic interests” (Shevtsova, 
2005, p. 59). Within his first year, Putin’s resilience quickly became apparent. He recentralized 
regional power, actively began pressurizing powerful oligarchs to remove their grip on the 
economy, and initiated the restructuring of the central government11 (Shevtsova, 2005). 
Tightening his grip over both society and the elites, he established what has become known as 
the ‘power vertical’. Closely related to the Russian idea of statism, also known as 
gosudarstvennichesvto, Putin expressed that in Russia, “the state and its institutions have 
always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people”; it is 
therefore that “for Russians a strong state is not an anomaly that should be disposed of”, but is 
rather seen as a “source of and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of 
any change” (as quoted in Tsygankov, 2016, p. 137).  
 From a theoretical standpoint, Vladimir Putin’s approach very much places Russia on 
the authoritarian side of the Carothers’ (2002) ‘gray zone’. Although Putin himself continues 
to consider Russia to be a democratic regime, severe discrepancies exist in all three of Levitsky 
and Way’s (2010, p. 7) three defining attributes of democracy. Elections under Putin have had 
consistently suspicious outcomes, civil liberties have been seriously restricted, and a 
reasonably level playing field is far from found in modern Russian politics.  
 Under Putin, Russian foreign policy has simultaneously been adapted in order to ensure 
its role as “a modern great power”, capable of adapting “to a changing world under state 
leadership” (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 137). While foreign policy during the 1990’s tended to be 
extremely statist and solely emphasize the external threats facing Russia, Putin’s approach has 
regarded the international system as containing of both threats and opportunities. 
                                                
11 For more on how this took place, see McFaul and Spector, 2010 
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As such, on one hand, under Putin Russia has focused on “strengthening economic and 
political positions”, allowing it to compete in what it views as a multipolar system (Mankoff, 
2009, p. 14). Russia’s vision of its role in this multipolar order emphasizes “the economic 
nature of the contemporary world”, and as such the growing need for “Russia to be successful 
in geo-economical” sense (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 138). This has meant that Russia uses its 
natural resources and economic potential to ensure its “broader integration into the world 
economy”, thus allowing it to establish its power internationally (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2000).  
However, on the other hand, Russia’s move towards multipolarity was being “offset” 
by “attempts to create structures of international relations by the developed countries of the 
West” (Mankoff, 2009, p. 15). Under the leadership of the U.S., these ‘structures’ predicated 
on unilateral resolutions of key problems in world politics, “circumventing the fundamental 
rules of international law” and sovereignty, undermining the development of a multipolar 
world order (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2000). In this context, 
foreign policy under Putin has very much remained focused on the threats of the international 
system: predominantly NATO. The 2000 security concept illustrates this thought, stating that 
the most “fundamental threats” to have developed in the international sphere have been “the 
strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances”, and above all, “NATO's eastward 
expansion”12 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2000). These 
viewpoints vis-à-vis NATO, the US, and Europe in general find their ultimate resonance in a 
speech given by Putin at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy.  
 
Multipolarity	and	the	NATO	Threat	
 
 Similar to the national security concept adopted in 2000, in his 2007 speech, Putin most 
clearly expressed Russia’s opposition to Western policies since the end of the Cold War. The 
speech first and foremost aimed at condemning the United States’ policy, noting that it had 
“overstepped its national borders in every way”, as it has sought to impose “economic, 
political, cultural, and educational policies” on other nations across the world (Putin, 2007). 
However, it also aimed at delineating a similar message regarding Russia itself, noting that 
“the economic potential of the new centers of global economic growth will inevitably be 
converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity” (Putin, 2007). Deducing 
                                                
12 The Russian view of the NATO as a threat has remained unchanged: in its 2014 military doctrine, NATO is 
still listed at the top of its “main external military dangers” (Lo, 2015)  
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that the “unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world”, Putin’s 
speech furthermore extensively illustrates that, to Russia, the global security system is in need 
of reinvention. NATO’s policy of expansion was heavily criticized in the speech, as Putin 
explained he did not see believe it “to have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance 
itself or with ensuring security in Europe” (Putin, 2007). Rather, its expansion “represents a 
serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust”, and risks the “sincere partnership 
with all the members of the big European family”, thereby threatening the stability of Europe 
(Putin, 2007).  
While the foreign policy documents of 2000 were an early signal of discontent with 
developments in the international order, the Munich speech in 2007 illustrates one its most 
outspoken rejections of it. With that, becoming one of the strongest depictions of the modern-
day tensions between NATO and Russia. Under Putin, it became increasingly evident that 
NATO and Russia were “pursuing two separate tracks of developing their security 
infrastructures” (Tsygankov, 2013, p. 179). His speech in Munich therefore marks the 
outspoken definition of Russian foreign policy, the publication of an approach to international 
politics which increasingly illustrates “an us-against-them model” (Casula, 2013, p. 7).  
 
Russian	Interests	in	the	Western	Balkans	
 
Cultural	Interests	
Within the historical context of Russian interests in the Western Balkans, one can trace 
its ties with the region back to the 1800’s. In the 19th century, Nicolas I of Russia focused his 
attention on the region, as he aimed to liberate the “Slavic and Orthodox nations in the Balkans 
and Southeastern Europe from the Ottoman Empire” (Wallander, 2007, p. 474). Russia later 
played a crucial role in helping Serbia and Montenegro gain de jure independence from the 
Ottoman empire during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, a conflict in which Slavic 
nationalist ideas played a role (Wallander, 2007, p. 477)13. While during the Soviet era, the 
intensity of ties was comparatively low - due to the split between Tito and Stalin – Russia 
became involved in the Balkans again during the later stages of the Yugoslav wars14. In the 
wake of NATO’s heavy targeting of Serbian economic infrastructure from the air15, Russia 
generally stood with the Serbs, sharing the viewpoint that the NATO campaign “was at best 
                                                
13 Russia went to war in Austro-Hungary in 1914 over Serbia (Headley, 2008). 
14 Russia however failed to support the Serbs for most of 1992-1994 against the West (Glenny, 2012, p. 639). 
15 Which caused extensive ‘collateral damage’. 
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inappropriate and at worst immoral” (Glenny, 2012, pp. 658-659). While it removed itself from 
regional peacekeeping operations in 2003, Russia has remained involved with Serbian matters 
concerning the Yugoslav wars, sharing the perspective that NATO violated Serbia’s 
sovereignty and as such acted completely out of accord with international law (Glenny, 2012, 
p. 659).  
Within the Western Balkans, Russians have remained predominantly popular with the 
Orthodox and Slavic populations, especially those that still believe in the idea Pan-Slavism16 
and with those that carry resentful sentiments against NATO (Headley, 2008). While Putin has 
somewhat separated church and state in his policy, he has been known to use the Orthodox 
Church as “an instrument” of foreign policy (Lo, 2015, p. 34). Although it is important to point 
out the Orthodox Church does in fact not ‘drive’ policy, under Putin the church - and its 
Patriarch Kirill – have been extremely useful “as a legitimating symbol”, whose “chief value” 
has been “highlighting Russia’s (and his own) virtues in contrast to a spiritually and morally 
bankrupt West” (Lo, 2015, p. 34). In the Western Balkans, Patriarch Kirill’s increasingly 
frequent visits to Serbia have been used to strengthen rhetoric of ties between the Russian and 
the Slavic/Orthodox communities, and has been “an important consideration in countering pro-
European tendencies in those countries” (Lo, 2015, p. 34). The emphasizing of shared values 
and culture has been a common element in Russian foreign policy, ever since the end of the 
Yugoslav wars. Highlighting the cruelty of the West has also been a common delineation which 
has provided Russia with much-needed support from the often-large Slavic and Eastern 
Orthodox communities across the Western Balkan states. For the purpose it serves, the question 
of ethnicity is a highly contentious issue in the Balkans, given the consistent fragmentation of 
ethnicity in almost each country17.  
 
Economic	Interests	
 The development of the Russian economy has been one of the predominant drivers of 
foreign policy under Putin. Forming a ‘gateway to Europe’ in terms of the export of natural 
resources, the Western Balkans as of recent have become of particular strategic economic 
interest to Russia. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 highlights that the Balkan region 
specifically “is of great strategic importance to Russia”, functioning as a “major transportation 
and infrastructure hub used for supplying gas and oil to European countries” (The Ministry of 
                                                
16 The political ideology advancing the unity of Slavic people. 
17 Generally speaking, Montenegro is split between Serbs and Montenegrins, Macedonia between Slavic 
Macedonians and Albanian Macedonians, and Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats.  
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Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013). Its most notable attempt at advancing these 
interests have been through the development of the South Stream Pipeline, a proposed pipeline 
designed to link Russia’s gas fields to Balkan markets, and on to Europe (Petrillo, 2013, p. 4). 
Having been proposed to stretch across Bulgaria and Serbia, with diversions towards 
Macedonia and Republika Srpska, the development of the pipeline was the most concrete 
signaling of its intent to gain a hand in the Balkan energy market. Much has been written about 
Russia’s capability to use the ‘energy weapon’; “the exploitation of energy exports and 
pipelines for geopolitical ends”, a worthy consideration in the Balkans (Lo, 2015, p. 28).  
 Bobo Lo (2015, p. 28) illustrates that the “use of economic tools to project power” is 
not strictly “limited to energy”. Under Putin, investments by Russian companies in “banking, 
finance, manufacturing, and transport industries” have grown across Eastern Europe, and the 
Western Balkans are no exception to this. James Headley (2008, 466) points out that, 
“indisputably, Putin believes that Russian interests are served by economic penetration of the 
Balkans”. Russian state-owned energy companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, and - 
the privately owned - Lukoil have increasingly penetrated the Balkan energy market through 
extensive investments (Smith, 2008). In 2009 for example, Gazprom Neft acquired a majority 
stake in the Serbian oil and gas company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), one of the region’s 
largest oil and gas companies (Gazprom, n.d.). Extending beyond energy, privatizations across 
the region have allowed Russian companies to get a foothold in many crucial Balkan industries, 
amongst which the tourism sector, its heavy industry, and also the banking and real estate 
industries (Headley, 2008, p. 463).   
 While the region-wide investments by Russian companies are without a doubt also the 
outcome of commercial motivations, it would be “naïve to disregard [their] geopolitical 
dividend”, as Bobo Lo (2015, p. 28) points out. Given that a vague line often exists between 
‘private’ and ‘state’ controlled firms, it is to no surprise that many analysts conclude that 
companies such as Rosneft, Gazprom, and Sberbank often act as “representatives of Russian 
national interests”18 (Headley, 2008, p. 465). While it is important to note that Russian 
companies cannot solely be considered as “mere instruments of the Kremlin”, their frequent 
participation in “often-fragile economies” can, and often does serve wider purposes (Headley, 
2008, p. 465). As such, the increasing of its economic footprint in the region, can be considered 
as a Russian tool of ‘soft power’. While as of yet far from capable of overtaking the European 
Union in economic terms, Russia has “tried to present itself as a credible and promising 
                                                
18 Rather than directly to their own shareholders. 
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economic and political counterpart for the Balkan countries” in light of the weakening 
European Union footprint in the region (Petrillo, 2013, p. 2).  
 
Geopolitical	Interests	
Within Russian foreign policy, its primary strategical security interests predominantly 
lie in its direct ‘near abroad’: its former Soviet Republics (with the exception of the Baltic 
states). While outside of this sphere, there are those that argue that the Balkans in general have 
an impact on the security of the Russian Federation in more classical geostrategic terms 
(Headley, 2008; Petrillo, 2013). Most rational of arguments have been the claims that Russia 
has historically had an interest in securing access to the Montenegrin port of Bar and to the Bay 
of Kotor, as its deep-sea port could be strategically valuable as a naval base with access to 
‘warmer waters’ (Vlahovic, 2017). 
  More significant within the framework of geopolitics, however, have been Russia’s 
relations vis-à-vis the Western led organizations of NATO and the European Union. While 
Russia considers the EU to be an enormously important trading bloc, it has little respect for its 
political stature. As such, Russia has increasingly challenged the assumptions of the EU, its 
values, rules, and institutions, and it furthermore views the aim to include Eastern European 
states as intrusive and “congenitally anti-Russian” (Lo, 2015, pp. 180-182). Central to its 
geopolitical concerns however, remains “the scope and the role of NATO” going eastward, and 
thus also in the Western Balkans. Serbia, a former adversary of NATO, remains Russia’s only 
true ‘ally’ due to its distancing from NATO, while simultaneously retaining an observing 
member position in the CSTO. With NATO membership an irreversible fact for Montenegro, 
Russia is seeing its window for military cooperation and the providing of influence within the 
region closing. It is in the context of NATO’s “thrust” eastward, as well as the lingering 
prospect of European Union enlargement in the Balkans, that a Kto Kogo (Lo, 2002) foreign 
policy has returned. While far from the Cold War mentality of ‘zero-sum equations’ and ‘for 
every winner there must be a loser’, Russia’s increased strategical resonance in the region as 
of recent does signal it has acknowledged that European integration would take place at the 
cost of Russian influence in a region of geopolitical, historical, and economic significance.
CHAPTER	3	–	The	Western	Balkans:	EU	Enlargement	Fatigue,	Russian	
Linkage,	To	What	End?	
 
EU	Enlargement	‘Fatigue’	and	the	Political	Vacuum	
 
Since the end of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s, the European Union has adopted a 
policy towards the Western Balkans aimed at promoting “peace, stability and economic 
development”, as well as opening up the prospect of EU integration (De Munter, 2017). While 
reaffirmations made at Thessaloniki (2003) regarding potential candidates for EU membership 
for all SAP19 countries seemed like a promising future for Western Balkan states, the EU’s 
engagement has proven itself as being “uneven and unsatisfactory”20 (Đurović, Bigović, & 
Milović, 2017, p. 246). As Corina Stratulat (2012, p. 2) of the European Policy Center already 
suggested as early as 2012, enlargement towards the Balkans will struggle “to remain at the 
heart of member states’ concerns”, as EU states have increasingly caught up with their “own 
economic, political and institutional uncertainties”. The EU’s reputation has become 
considerably tarnished, as the increasing sentiment of ‘enlargement fatigue’ - a simple 
“unwillingness to grant EU membership to new states”- as well as the damaging legacy of the 
Eurozone crisis has harmed Europe’s solidarity with the Western Balkan states (Đurović, 
Bigović, & Milović, 2017, p. 246). To no surprise, “the previously successful ‘external 
incentives model’ has run aground on the rocks”, as negotiation chapters are frozen and 
candidate states fail to implement new reforms (Đurović, Bigović, & Milović, 2017, p. 246). 
While it would be far removed from the truth to say the Western Balkans are no longer on the 
path to EU accession, events over the past few years have discerned the EU’s attention away 
from the region, leaving its vulnerable and fundamentally weak states without a certain future. 
There is a danger to the putting on hold of enlargement, as Dimitar Bechev (2012, p. 7) points 
out: it “allows other actors to seize on business opportunities, score political points and carve 
out niches of influence”, allowing them to free ride “on the tremendous investment into 
stability already made by the EU”. The political vacuum that is arising out of this complex 
situation has opened the possibility for external actors to exert political and economic 
influence, at the cost of further Western integration.  
Amongst Balkan citizens, these trends have also been reflected in the declining public 
                                                
19 The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), launched in 1999 by the EU (De Munter, 2017). 
20 With the exception of Croatia. 
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opinion regarding EU integration, and by the more frequently emerging ‘pro-Kremlin’ 
constituencies in the Balkan countries. Often regarded as the “fifth column in a Kremlin 
strategy to undermine European unity, discredit democratic liberalism, and diminish Europe’s 
regional and international weight”, such constituencies may side with Russia on the basis of a 
hostility towards “an EU-centered wider Europe”, but may also do so on the basis of a “deeper 
foundation”: the foundation of shared “historical pan-Slavism” or “shared Orthodox faith” (Lo, 
2015, p. 192). While historically, support for EU membership has been relatively high amongst 
Balkan citizens, support for the EU and their integration paths have declined accordingly. As 
the old “promise of modernization and convergence with the rich and well- governed countries 
of old Europe” is fading, “pro-Moscow” attitudes may in fact increase (Bechev, 2012, p. 6).  
 
Montenegro	
 
 One of the smallest and newest states21 in the Balkans, of the three states in question 
Montenegro has undergone one of the most promising transformations towards 
democratization. Under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its 
charismatic leader Milo Đukanović, institutions have been transformed, a liberal economy has 
been introduced, and civil liberties have accordingly undergone improvement (Komar & 
Živković, 2016, p. 785). Considering it to be their foreign policy priority to join the European 
Union, Montenegro applied for accession in 2008 and began negotiations in June of 2012 
(Montenegro & EU, 2017). Given that accession negotiations have dramatically slowed down, 
enlargement fatigue also appears to have affected Montenegro. As of early 2017, Montenegro 
stands to be the latest state to join NATO, which it believes will “guarantee stability and 
security for pursuing other strategic goals”, amongst which, EU integration (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Montenegro, 2017). Ethnically speaking, the 
country is composed of 44.98% ethnic Montenegrins, 28.73% ethnic Serbs, as well as of 8.65% 
and 4.91% ethnic Bosniaks and Albanians respectively, with a majority (72.07%) of the 
population being of Christian Orthodox background, an important consideration when studying 
it in this context (Government of Montenegro - Public Relations Bureau, 2013, pp. 8-9).  
 
 
                                                
21 Montenegro only formally became independent from Serbia in 2006, following referendum in which a 55.5% 
vote in favor of independence was recorded (Government of Montenegro - Public Relations Bureau, 2013, p. 
11) 
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Weaknesses	
 With the first transition towards pluralism having taken place in 1990, Montenegro has 
spent that past two decades working on transitioning into a fully consolidated democracy. 
While of all the Western Balkan states, it has made longest strides towards doing democratic 
consolidation, issues of governance continue to pervade the state. According to Freedom 
House’s ‘Nations in Transit’ report (2016), the pace of reforms has increasingly slowed down 
in Montenegro, and as a result, its democracy score has dropped from 3.79 to 3.93 between 
2010 and 2016. While it is hard to conclude whether the slowing down of reforms is to be 
blamed on the supposed ‘enlargement fatigue’ of the EU, or the result of internal factors in 
Montenegro, institutions remain too weak to cope with widespread corruption, tackle “abuse 
of power” and the “misuse of public resources for party purposes”, as well as suffering from a 
notable lack of transparency (Marović, 2016, p. 1).  
 Another notable issue in Montenegro has been the repetitive election of a single party. 
In Montenegro, polls have shown citizens generally do not believe their voice is of importance, 
and rather repeatedly vote for the DPS simply based on “nationality, habitual patterns of 
political behavior, and the image of invincibility22” (Komar & Živković, 2016, p. 799). The 
nationalist/ethnic issue deriving from this, is that the DPS has consistently been the only major 
party to ‘monopolize’ the Montenegrin side, subsequently making it almost “impossible for the 
opposition to unite and build a coalition strong enough to jeopardize its rule” (Komar & 
Živković, 2016, p. 795). Serb interests, therefore, are often completely marginalized, 
undoubtedly creating a sentiment of resistance within the Serbian factions for the DPS’ 
European course, working to the advantage of Russian interests in Montenegro.  
 Heavily dependent on European imports and exports, the Montenegrin economy 
drastically suffered from the lasting effects of Euro-crisis. As a result of the crisis, 
Montenegro’s economy experienced a serious drop in exports to the Euro area: over 50 percent 
(Bartlett & Prica, 2013, p. 371). Burdened with “high levels of public debt, sizeable budget 
deficits and large current account deficits”, the Montenegrin government has been struggling 
to regain traction since the end of the Euro-crisis (O'Brennan, 2014, p. 232). These “structural 
imbalances” have domestically only been worsened by inefficient and “high government 
spending”, and an all-round “political inability to curb it” (Bartlett & Prica, 2013, p. 372). 
Resulting in high unemployment rates - doubling from under 12% to over 24% (2012-2017) – 
the Euro-crisis has thus-far had a dismal effect on the Montenegrin economy, inducing anti-
                                                
22 For more on Image of Invincibility, see Komar & Živković, 2016 
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EU sentiments amongst a portion of its citizens (Trading Economics, 2017).  
 While it remains quite clear that the political direction for Montenegro, as outlined by 
its foreign policy, is geared towards accession in both NATO and the EU, public opinion polls 
published by CEDEM in December, 2016 exposed troubling figures. In the survey, when asked 
if regardless of their opinion, “Montenegro will become a NATO member state”, respondents 
answered with an overwhelming 53.8% that they believed their opinion would be disregarded 
(CEDEM (B), 2016). When asked whether they supported Montenegro’s accession to NATO, 
results showed a sharp divide in opinion: at that time, 39.5% would answer yes, 39.7% would 
answer no, while the remaining 20.8% did not want to commit (CEDEM (B), 2016). 
Considering there has been an unwillingness of the Đukanović23 administration to hold a 
referendum, as well as that public support of Montenegro’s foreign policy has never exceeded 
47%, these figures illustrate a concerning trend (CEDEM (A), 2016). While support for the EU 
in general is higher (63%) than that of NATO, its drop from 76% (2009-2016) highlights the 
effect of the Euro-Crisis and the decreasing optimism about an EU future (CEDEM (B), 2016).  
  
Linkages	
 While the West retains strong influence over Montenegro, Russia has managed to 
emphasize historical linkages as well as build new ones between 2012 and 2016. Over the past 
few years, the Montenegrin Metropolitanate, part of the Serbian Orthodox Church, has often 
aligned itself with its Serb and Russian counterparts, increasingly fueling opposition towards 
the European integration path set out by the DPS and its allies (Tomovic, 2016). The Russian 
Orthodox Church often denounces NATO, describing its presence in the Balkans as a “crusade 
against the Christian Orthodox faith” while also critiquing “national Orthodox churches whose 
countries were members of the EAPC and Partnership for Peace” (Evans, 2002, p. 40). As 
Russia’s rhetoric has become increasingly hostile regarding Montenegro’s ‘European choice’, 
its Orthodox Church has often backed these expressions. In January of 2016, the Montenegrin 
Metropolitanate – part of the Serbian Church – called its followers to an anti-NATO protest in 
the capital city of Podgorica, where pro-Russian parties were simultaneously celebrating the 
traditional Orthodox beginning of the year, also known as the ‘Serb New Year’ (Tomovic, 
2016). Occurrences such as these highlight the increasing influence of the Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro regarding political matters, fueling division between pro-Western and anti-
Western citizens, a line often drawn between two ethnicities (Montenegrin and Serb). 
                                                
23 And now, Marković. 
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 More recent Russian linkages have centered on Montenegro’s economy. While Russian 
businessmen were already active in Montenegro since the early 1990’s, following its 
independence in 2006, Montenegro became a favorite target for foreign investors in real estate, 
all predominantly of Russian descent24 (Violante, 2017, pp. 90-91). Underlying these 
investments, was the fact that Montenegro law dictated that foreign investors “could not own 
real estate property without being part of a registered business company”, leading to a boom 
of newly created business associations following 2006 (Violante, 2017, p. 91). From this, 
Russian businessmen gradually gained a hold over a multitude of national assets. While the 
2008 global financial crisis had serious implications for the economy of Russia, amongst which 
Putin’s “curb on property ownership abroad in 2013”, economic ties between the two states 
remained remarkably strong “in real estate, tourism and industry” (Violante, 2017, p. 93). This 
relationship has remained so strong, that by 2014 reports estimated that as much as 32% of 
Montenegrin enterprises were under Russian ownership, making Russia Montenegro’s largest 
inward investor (Violante, 2017, p. 93; Clark & Foxall, 2014, p. 10).  The concentration of 
trade flows with Russia has managed to extend beyond just tourism and real estate, as Russian 
investments have also entered other sectors, such as its aluminum industry25 (World Bank, 
2016, p. 44). In addition to Montenegrin businesses increasingly relying upon Russian capital, 
currently around a third of the vital tourist industry has come to depend on Russian nationals 
(Clark & Foxall, 2014, p. 10). While Russian capital has gained a strong hand in some of 
Montenegro’s domestic industries, as a trading partner, it remains relatively weak. For 
Montenegro, its primary export partners are Serbia ($77.2M), Italy ($50.1M), Pakistan 
($34.2M), as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina ($32.7M), while its primary import partners 
consist of Serbia ($638M), China ($231M), Bosnia and Herzegovina ($144M), and Croatia 
($134M), with Russia being much further down this list (The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity, 2015). These figures illustrate that, Russia does not command strong bilateral 
economic relations with Montenegro. As such, its only position of leverage going forward, can 
originate from its provision of tourism and capital. Thus far, Russia has only threatened to take 
advantage of this position, as it did when it threatened to end visa-free travel in the wake of 
Montenegro’s joining in on Western Sanctions over Crimea (Clark & Foxall, 2014, p. 10). 
 Politically speaking, Russia has few direct ties to the current leadership of Montenegro, 
although it has showed a desire to connect to Serb opposition parties. Despite Russia’s efforts 
                                                
24 Leading to the beginning of a real estate boom. 
25 One of its leading export products. 
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at preventing the DPS’s pursuit of European integration, Montenegro has seen its way through 
to NATO membership. While not few relations exist with the DPS, there have been converging 
relationships between Russia and Serb opposition parties: a trend which has emulated 
throughout the Balkans. Specifically, considerable ties exist with the Democratic Front (DF), 
who at the latest elections in 2016 provided a “trident anti-NATO voice” (Darmanović, 2017, 
p. 124). During these elections, Russian funds were reported to have gone to the DF and its 
campaign, as well as “to media outlets and NGOs that ardently opposed NATO membership” 
(Darmanović, 2017)26. In 2016, United Russia -Putin’s party- signed a non-binding agreement 
of ‘military neutrality’ agreement with multiple far-right, Pro-Russian, and Anti-NATO parties 
from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Bulgaria (BIRN, 2016). 
Although the agreement itself does not represent much more than a willingness to cooperate 
on a “regional strategic doctrine” which can later be “incorporated into pan-European 
considerations of a new continental security architecture”, it illustrates the growing 
collaboration between the Russian government and anti-Western parties (BIRN, 2016). 
Though imminent, the topic of NATO membership has furthermore become increasingly 
contentious between Serb and Montenegrin political parties. It’s funding schemes in the 2016 
elections illustrates Russia’s attempt to expose weaknesses relating to one of the core dividing 
factors in Montenegro, the much-disputed question of ethnicity.  
 
Republic	of	Macedonia	(FYROM)	
 
 Of all the former Yugoslav republics that gained independence in the 1990’s, 
Macedonia has arguably been the most fragile of the new states to emerge (Glenny, 2012, pp. 
655-656). Marred by economic and political strife, Macedonia has been subject to some of the 
most significant ethnic tensions in the Balkans in the past decade. With a population of 
approximately 2,1 million people, the country is ethnically composed of approximately 64% 
Macedonians, 25% Albanians, 4% Turkish, and only 1.8% Serb (Republic of Macedonia State 
Statistical Office, 2016)27. The main dividing line of ethnicity stands between (often Slavic) 
Macedonians and Albanians. During the communist era, the Albanians of Macedonia had 
suffered from extremely brutal treatment at the hands of the Macedonian communist 
authorities, worse than Kosovo Albanians in Serbia (Glenny, 2012, p. 656). As a result, ever 
                                                
26 The 2016 elections furthermore gained significant attention, as reports arose regarding a Serb/Russian-backed 
plot aimed at overthrowing the government. This issue, discussed in the final section of this chapter, remains 
evidentially unfounded, and can therefore not yet be considered as a credible case of attempted leverage. 
27 2002 estimates. 
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since its independence, Macedonian Albanians have expected the government to demonstrate 
greater respects for their rights, something Macedonian politicians for a long time have 
promised to “find a modus vivendi for” (Glenny, 2012, p. 656). In terms of foreign policy, 
Macedonia declares its ‘strategic’ and ‘long-term’ goal to be “full-fledged EU and NATO 
membership for Macedonia”. (Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). 
While it remains a priority to commence the pre-accession negotiations “as soon as possible”, 
the negotiations, as of yet, have not been scheduled (Republic of Macedonia Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2017). Its NATO accession furthermore remains highly controversial, given 
that NATO-member state Greece has blocked its accession over a naming dispute. While a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) has been extended, Greece continues to veto any decisions 
regarding Macedonia’s entrance into NATO, as well as the EU, regardless of the fact that both 
organizations find it unacceptable that a naming dispute is used as ‘obstacle’ (Geddes & Taylor, 
2016, p. 942).  
 
Weaknesses	
 Similar to Montenegro, the most inherent weakness prone to external pressure has been 
its ethnic diversity. Since its independence, issues of group rights have consistently placed the 
Albanian minority at odds with Macedonian politics. The resulting “ethnification of politics 
has kept questions of democratic accountability and corruption permanently in the 
background” (Dolonec, 2013, p. 89). These issues date back to the 1990’s, when Macedonian 
and Albanian political elites clashed about issues such as the most basic ideas “behind the 
concept of state”, elements of the constitution, laws on education, as well about public 
administration (Daskalovski, 2004, p. 52). While a fragile peace was maintained between the 
two ethnic parties during this period, violence erupted between Macedonians and Albanians in 
2001 as the crisis in Kosovo escalated and a flood of refugees spilled over into Macedonia 
(Glenny, 2012, p. 658; Dolonec, 2013, p. 89). The resolution of this conflict found itself in the 
signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), whose basic purpose was to secure the 
“future of Macedonia's democracy”, as well as to promote the peaceful development of civil 
society while “respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens” 
(OFA, 2001). While the agreement appeared promising in its capability to address issues 
between the two ethnicities, the agreement has been argued as having created a ‘bi-national 
state’ (Dolonec, 2013, p. 89). The OFA therefor appears to “have institutionalized a lasting 
challenge” to the development of the state, as the issue of ethnic group rights has come to 
“permanently [dominate] the political agenda at the expense of further democratization” 
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(Dolonec, 2013, p. 89). With Macedonians, generally being of Slavic ethnicity, Russian 
pressure on these groups can expose unresolved fears vis-à-vis their Albanian counterparts. 
While democratic institutions do exist, and manage to “perform their basic functions”, 
factors of governance have been a consistent issue in Macedonia, undermining these 
democratic institutions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a, p. 13). Up until the resignation of the 
Prime-Minister, Nikolas Gruevski, in January of 2016, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE maintained 
a “firm grip over key democratic institutions”, being able to rule without many without much 
accountability to parliament (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a). Largely of a nationalist 
orientation, the rule of VMRO-DPMNE has been labeled by the smaller opposition parties 
(SDSM and BDI/DUI) as operating along authoritarian lines (MacDowall, 2015). While 
VMRO-DPMNE disputes this, reforms since 2006 have given it increasing – significant even 
– influence over the judiciary, as well as over the public broadcasting (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2016a, p. 13). In 2016, an EC report noted that the judicial situation had been “backsliding 
since 2014”, and that “achievements of the previous decade’s reform process have been 
undermined by recurrent political interference in the work of the judiciary” (European 
Commission, 2016a, p. 5). The World Press Freedom Index dropped Macedonia from 34th 
place in 2006 to 118th in 2016, placing it amongst countries such as the United Arab Emirates 
and Afghanistan (Reporters Without Borders, 2016). Revelations such as the “large-scale and 
illegal government wiretapping of journalists, corrupt ties between officials and media owners, 
and an increase in threats and attacks on media workers”, are cited as being the most concerning 
developments (Freedom House, 2016b). Reporters are often forced to either adopt “a pro-
government viewpoint or lose their job”, resulting in significant self-censorship (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2016a). To no surprise, Freedom House constituted (another) year over year decline 
in democratic indicators in 201628, subsequently labelling Macedonia as a ‘hybrid regime’ 
(Freedom House, 2016a). Reports such as these have emphasized the institutional weakness of 
Macedonia, and are arguably illustrative of a backward progression towards a more 
authoritarian form of governance.  
While Macedonia has a “good level of preparation in developing into a functioning 
market economy”, indicators show its economy has a long way yet to go (European 
Commission, 2016a, p. 25). Troubling remains its unemployment rate (24%) and the poor 
macroeconomic stability – on a downward progression – in the wake of the political crisis that 
developed between the Macedonian and Albanian political parties (European Commission, 
                                                
28 A downward trajectory which Macedonia has been on since 2011. 
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2016a). Nevertheless, as the next section will illustrate, it is seeking to diversify its economy 
in the wake of an unsure future with its European partners. 
While within Macedonia, there is general support for integration into Western 
organizations, as per the regional trend, there has been growing skepticism, as captured by 
public opinion indices. While above the numbers witnessed in Montenegro, public opinion 
polls measured by the International Republican Institute (2016, p. 31) reported a drop from 
87% support for NATO integration to 73%, between 2012 and 2016. In a similar trend, support 
for accession to the EU dropped from 84% to 71% during the same measured time period. 
While still showing relative support for the European path of integration, these figures illustrate 
the growing skepticism in Macedonian public opinion regarding Western-led institutions, a 
point which can be used to the advantage of Russia as it seeks to gain influence.   
 
Linkage	
 In terms of linkage, Macedonia has arguably only recently become of more interest to 
Russia. This intensification of ties has coincided with the development of a political crisis in 
Macedonia (2014-2016) between the Macedonian and Albanian Parties. Throughout this 
period, two general discourses have developed regarding the involvement of external 
influences in Macedonia. One the one hand, Western news outputs have argued that Russia 
seeks to take advantage of a political conflict, arguing that it seeks to stimulate the political 
crisis in order to further “diminish prospects for Macedonia’s entry into NATO and the EU” 
(Bugajski, 2017). Discourse from Russian outputs29, on the other hand, have tapped into the 
fears of nationalist-Macedonians, stressing that under NATO and EU –all predominantly 
American-led- patronage, “the foundations for a greater Albania have begun to take shape” 
(Papadopoulos, 2017). Russia itself has furthermore stressed that Western powers in fact seek 
to threaten regime stability, and has ‘warned’ the West about inciting regime protests, voicing 
concerns that it seeks to stimulate a color revolution there (Bouchet, 2016, p. 1). Through this 
discourse, Russia has gradually been presented as the backer of the majority Slav-Orthodox 
Macedonian side, while the United States and Europe are framed as the supporters of the 
Muslim Albanian population.  
 The historical linkages Russia shares with Macedonia are subsequently also based on a 
shared Slav background and Eastern Orthodox values. Within Macedonia, Slavism and the 
Orthodox church have long been of importance to its culture. While during the communist era, 
                                                
29 Largely shared via media outputs such as RT and Sputnik 
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most communist governments sought to remove much of the religious tendencies in their 
countries, the communist government in Macedonia ‘eagerly’ promoted the “acceptance of a 
distinct Macedonian Slavic nationality” and the “establishment of an autonomous Orthodox 
church (Petrovich, 2000, p. 1375). Following independence, Slavic and Orthodox traditions 
have remained a strong conception within Macedonia, fundamentally fueling the differences 
Macedonians have with Albanians. While up until 2011, relatively little emphasis was placed 
on shared history, increasing interaction between the Russian and Macedonian government in 
the period 2012-2016 have led to the emphasizing of a ‘shared history’ between the two sides. 
This first became apparent when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov chose to visit 
Ohrid30, instead of Skopje, in April of 2011: a visit aimed out discussing cultural and 
humanitarian links31 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2011; 
Marusic, 2011). These links were further reinforced in 2014 as construction began on the first 
Russian Orthodox Church in Skopje; largely considered as a significant step towards 
rapprochement between Russia and Macedonia, and their respective churches (Braw, 2015). 
Russia furthermore established a cultural influence center at the University in Skopje, arranged 
by the Russkiy Mir Foundation32 (independent.mk, 2016). While Western outputs tend to 
overemphasize the significance of such events; the building of a single church and a cultural 
center must not be overemphasized. It does however represent the gradual strengthening of ties 
between Russia and Macedonia in a variety of areas, characteristic of Russia’s soft power 
approach in the Western Balkans. Given Russia’s strong emphasis on ‘history’ and shared 
values in its discourse towards other countries, consideration must be given to the emphasizing 
of spiritual and cultural linkage. 
 Economically speaking, ties have also only really begun developing since 2011. While 
Macedonian imports and exports are centered around Western European countries such as 
Germany and the United Kingdom, and more closely to countries such as Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Greece, Macedonia has been diversifying its economy. As a result of the failure to “make 
progress in NATO and EU integration, the government has tried to diversify international 
cooperation by reaching out to Russia, China and India” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a, p. 34). 
While its imports from (2.1%) and exports to (1%) Russia remain fairly scarce compared to its 
major partners such as Germany (13% import, 38% export) and Serbia (7.9% import, 6.9% 
                                                
30 Which is considered as one of the ‘centers of Orthodox Christianity and Slavic literature’. 
31 Such as holding ‘Days of Macedonian Spiritual Culture’ in Russia, as well as the discussing the prospects of 
establishing information and cultural centers in Moscow and Skopje. 
32 A foundation established by presidential decree in 2007 aimed at “enhancing and encouraging the 
appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture (Russkiy Mir Foundation, 2017) 
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export), Russia has signaled a clear intent to increase its share in the energy industry. Most 
notable have been efforts to become part of the Russian led pipeline projects, of which two 
have been proposed to involve Macedonia. Within a year of Lavrov’s visit to Ohrid in 2011, 
the Macedonian and Russian government, in collaboration with Gazprom, reached an 
agreement on the inclusion of Macedonia on the South Stream pipeline, an agreement signed 
in 2013 (Republic Of Macedonia Ministry of Finance, 2012). While the pipeline was originally 
not planned to include Macedonia, Russia’s willingness to divert the proposed pipeline 
signaled a clear interest in gaining economic influence in Macedonia. While the 50-billion-
dollar project eventually fell apart, South Stream has been replaced by the prospect of ‘Turkish 
Stream’, a project in which both Macedonia and Russia have expressed interest for. While no 
concrete plans have been made as of yet, options remain open for Russia to enter the 
Macedonian economy, a consideration worthy of attention considering the willingness of the 
Macedonian government to present itself with alternatives to the fading hopes of Western 
integration.  
 Political ties have also increasingly strengthened between Macedonia and Russia. As 
has been mentioned, Russia’s tapping into nationalist fears has given it a point of contention 
against the more Western-oriented Albanian parties. However, notable has also been the 
decision of Macedonia, together with Serbia, to be amongst the only Western Balkan states not 
to join EU sanctions against Russia over the Crimea (IANS, 2014). While the implications of 
this must not be over exaggerated, it does place Macedonia in a relatively select group of states 
that haven’t unconditionally supported the EU in its divergence with Russia over Ukraine and 
Crimea. In a trend taking place across the Western Balkans, a small Serb party, the Democratic 
Party of Serbs in Macedonia (DPSM), signed a military neutrality agreement with Putin’s 
party, United Russia in 2016. While most parties signing the agreement represented opposition 
parties, in Macedonia the DPSM -until 2016- was in fact part of the leading coalition led by 
VMRO-DPMNE. The agreement signed was received by Albanian parties in Macedonia with 
much opposition, who believed it to be a sign that Macedonian Serb interests were diverging 
away from Euro-Atlantic integration (Marusic, 2016).  
  
 
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(BiH)	and	the	Republika	Srpska	(RS)	
 
In 1995, following four years of heavy conflict, the Dayton agreement was signed by 
Slobodan Milošević (FR Yugoslavia), Alija Izetbegović (BIH) and Franjo Tuđman (Croatia), 
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marking the beginning of democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). While the Dayton 
agreements were designed to unite the state under international supervision, the country that 
emerged from it was divided into two major zones, each “a de facto para-state” “dominated by 
largely illiberal wartime ethno-national elites” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016b, p. 4) . In the 
Dayton accords, lines were drawn in order to divide the states according to two identities, 
“roughly one half to a Muslim–Croat federation and the other to Serbs (in Republika Srpska)” 
(Robinson, Engelsoft, & Pobric, 2001, p. 958). Within the ‘post-Dayton’ constitution of BiH, 
the Serbian-dominated, Republika Srpska (RS), has become a “well-centralized ‘state within a 
state’, with its own president, government and ministries, parliament and constitutional court 
(Marciacq, 2015, p. 330). Since the end of the war in 1995, BiH has been overseen by a “U.N.-
mandated High Representative exercising executive powers”, whose task, in addition to 
overseeing its democratization, has been “to remove individuals accused of impeding peace 
implementation” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016b, p. 4). While in theory the international 
community’s participation in Bosnia’s democratization process should have overseen the 
reconciliation of the competing Bosniak, Serb, and Croat interests, nationalist rhetoric has 
gained significant traction and democratization has come to a standstill. At this point in time, 
given its protectorate status, integration into the European Union and into NATO remain a very 
distant prospect for the small and vulnerable state. 
 
Weaknesses	
 Ethnically speaking, the Bosnian state, with its two separate entities, constitute an 
extremely fragile balancing act between three different ethnicities. In 2013, for the first time 
since the early 1990’s, a census was carried out to outline the demographics of the entire state. 
While it took almost three years to publish the results33, the survey outlined the divided 
demographics of the state (Toe, 2016a). Its shows that BiH in its entirety is composed of 50.1% 
Bosniaks, 15.4% Croats, and 30.7% Serbs (BHAS, 2016, p. 54). In RS however, the composure 
of ethnicity constitutes of 81.5% Serb and only 13.9% Bosniak, with a mere 2.4% being Croat 
(BHAS, 2016, p. 54). This final figure highlights the stark contrast in ethnic composures, and 
how the balancing of ethnic relations in has long been forgone in the modern Bosnian state. In 
the context of Russian interests, this ethnic cleavage is important to note due to Russia’s strong 
appeal to individuals of Serb ethnicity. The most vulnerable area in recent years prone to 
external influence has been the continuous discourse coming from Banja Luka34 regarding the 
                                                
33 The results remain widely disputed by Bosnian Serb officials. 
34 The Administrative capital of RS 
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right to self-determination, as well as the holding of a referendum on the independence of 
Republika Srpska. Its president, Milorad Dodik, is widely perceived by the West as being a 
disruptive force, using an increasingly nationalist rhetoric targeted at the Muslim majority in 
BiH35 (Toal, 2013, p. 199). RS leadership has often used its veto-right in foreign policy, 
blocking votes regarding the recognizing of the Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence 
(Marciacq, 2015, p. 333). Politicization of ethnicity as such has continued to marginalize “the 
EU agenda, as well as other democratizing/liberalizing agendas more generally” (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2016b, p. 5).  
 Another pronounced weakness of RS, and BiH, as a whole, has been its weak economy 
and its subsequent dependency on external forces. Following the war, BiH and its two entities 
were left “economically devastated”, beginning the long road towards mending damage done 
to their respective economies (Marciacq, 2015, p. 329). While BiH as a whole has been making 
a transition towards a market economy, it has a long way to go. In 2016, the European 
Commission noted that Bosnia is very much still “at an early stage in developing a functioning 
market economy”, and that its economic growth, although progressing, has remained too low 
for its citizens to experience a “noticeable improvement” (European Commission, 2016b). 
While a strengthened commitment to reforms has been observed by the EC, political issues 
continue to hamper any significant progression in the right direction. In RS, just as in much of 
BiH, social conditions remain extremely strained: unemployment subsists around 25%, and the 
average monthly wage has not exceeded 425€ (Republic of Srpska Government, 2016, p. 6). 
Blaming the BiH leadership for its predicament, the poor state of the economy in RS has been 
used by Dodik as a nationalist rhetoric, arguing it’s secession from BiH. In a paper called “Your 
Srpska, Your Vote”, Dodik noted in 2010 that “sovereignty was the goal and that only an 
independent RS could reach its full economic potential” (Toal, 2013, p. 192). While talk of 
secession are mostly perceived as hollow threats, Dodik’s mobilizing of a nationalist rhetoric 
remains an inherent weakness troubling the institutionally weak state.  
 In terms of support for the future integration of the EU and NATO, public opinion 
remains fairly cynical about the prospects. Although intricate public opinions polls are fairly 
rare occurrences in Bosnia, the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in BiH published a 
report in 2015, amongst which were questions regarding EU membership. In it, when asked 
how they felt about BiH and the EU, 27.6% of respondents (Serb) believed EU membership is 
the only way for BiH to survive, 13.4% of respondents (Serb) felt membership was preferable, 
                                                
35 All the while he seeks support for this cause from external actors, amongst which Russia and Serbia. 
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but not ‘critical for the survival of the country’, while 24.2% of respondents (Serb) noted they 
are not interested in the EU and 17% (Serb) noting that the EU will fall apart before BiH 
becomes a member (UNRCO BiH, 2015, p. 70). Though following along the wider lines of the 
general sentiment regarding the EU in BiH, Serb respondents in this public opinion poll 
represent rather notably weak support for the EU. Considered a weakness with regard to the 
EU, these sentiments can, similar to the previous two case studies, work to the advantage of 
Russian interests. 
	
Linkages	
 Since the establishment of Republika Srpska as a separate entity of BiH, Russia has 
reinforced many of its linkages with its Serb population, as well as aligning with a multitude 
of contentious issues in favor of the Serb majority. Its historical linkage to RS dates back to 
the 1990’s when Russia made up part of the Contact Group36 tasked with finding a solution to 
the Bosnian conflict. While most international actors in this group preferred outcomes more 
favorable for the Muslim Bosniaks and Croats, the Russians stood strong with the Serbs in 
these negotiations, as they did for much of the later days of the Yugoslav wars. It petitioned 
that “Republika Srpska should have identical rights to the Muslim-Croat Federation”, including 
the right to “confederation relations with Serbia” (Headley, 2008, p. 199). Russia has 
furthermore strongly emphasized its shared Slavic and Orthodox traditions with RS. Not only 
has it emphasized the role of NATO in the Yugoslav wars, Russia has supported Serb outcomes 
in a number of decisions regarding the Bosnian war, such as the UN resolution condemning 
the mass killing of men and boys in Srebrenica as a genocide. Having vetoed the decision in 
2015, Sergey Lavrov noted that in the UN Security Council, “certain forces are attempting to 
promote an absolutely anti-Serb resolution”, one that “provides an incorrect–even legally 
incorrect–interpretation of what had occurred” (Lavrov, 2015). Although the exact sequence 
of events in the Bosnian war remains highly debated, Russia’s support for its Serb counterparts 
in Bosnia has been one of the clearest illustrations of it within the Western Balkan ethnic 
divides. 
 More recently, Russia has established extensive economic linkages with Republika 
Srpska, creating somewhat of a dependency. Most notable of the ties has been the creation of 
a Russian energy dependence by RS. While exports from RS to the Russian Federation have 
centered on agricultural products, Russia has been the largest partner for imports to RS with 
                                                
36 The Contact Group was composed of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, with 
observers from the EC and EU also often being present at negotiations as observers. 
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annual turnovers of around 1 million to 600,000 tons, mostly centered in the energy sector, 
given Russia a near-monopoly over it (Toe, 2016b; Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, 
2016). The gradually increasing presence of Russian energy firms, amongst which Lukoil 
Neftochim, Gazprom Neft and Zarubezhneft, have confirmed the increasing bilateral links 
between Banja-Luka and Moscow (Bechev, 2015). These energy firms have increasingly 
invested their control into Bosnian oil refineries, which through “a joint venture with Russian 
majority shareholders holds the exclusive rights in gas and oil extraction” in most of RS (Bieri, 
2015, p. 2). As has been the case with Macedonia and Serbia, up until the cancellation of the 
project in 2014, the RS was furthermore widely regarded as an important link in the chain of 
the South Stream project as a diversion from the Serbian section was planned to supply RS 
(Fatić, 2010, pp. 447-449). While the plans for the South Stream project will likely never be 
realized, Russia’s grip on RS’s energy market has become substantial throughout the past 7 
years, giving it a position of leverage over RS politics.  
 Throughout Putin’s third term as president, Russia has established thorough contacts 
with the government in Banja-Luka. Milorad Dodik, president of RS and leader of the Alliance 
of Social Democrats37 (SNSD) consistently stands at the opposite side of the central 
government Sarajevo, and with Western governments. While the Dayton Agreement and the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina dictate that foreign policy and foreign trade policy 
“are the responsibility of central institutions”, RS has often acted on its own accord in bilateral 
relations with other states (Marciacq, 2015, pp. 333-334). As such, RS has aimed its foreign 
policy at strengthening relations with two states; Serbia and Russia (Marciacq, 2015, p. 334). 
Political relations between Russia and RS have centered around the common stance on Western 
institutions, and on mutual support in international diplomatic matters (Marciacq, 2015). One 
notable instance of such support, has been the RS’s blocking of Bosnia’s participation in the 
sanctions against Russia over Crimea and Ukraine (Hellquist, 2016, p. 1012). Russia has 
furthermore shown support for the controversial referendum regarding RS’s national day, 
standing strong with the opinion that Bosnia and its entities have the right to dictate their own 
internal affairs, without the need for intervention of the High Representative, largely backing 
Russia’s worldview on sovereignty and non-intervention (Kovacevic, 2016; The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2011). 
 
                                                
37 Whose viewpoints are generally Socialism, Serbian Nationalism and Right-Wing Populism (Stojarová, 2010) 
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To	What	End?	Understanding	the	Russian	Approach	
 
 So far, this thesis has shown how, over time, Russia has managed to manifest various 
linkages in the Western Balkans. It has however, so far, largely left the question unanswered 
regarding to what end these linkages do in fact serve. Based on the theory of Levitsky and Way, 
the linkages established by Russia should provide it with the capability to exert leverages, 
amongst which are political conditionality, punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and in the 
most serious of instances, military intervention (2005, p. 21). However, despite the gradual 
reinforcement of Russian linkages, leverage on the case studies in question has thus far been 
notably limited. While in the period between 2012-2017 there have been several instances of 
alleged acts of ‘leverage’, due to their widely disputed and still-ongoing nature, it would be 
irresponsible to draw conclusions from them. Two of such instances have been the reports 
about a Russian-backed coup and assassination plot to overthrow the Montenegrin government 
during the 2016 elections (IISS, 2017), as well as claims - based on ‘leaked documents’ - that 
Russian agents in Skopje are actively attempting to influence Macedonian media outlets and 
as well as its political elite (Belford, Cvetkovska, Sekulovska, & Dojčinović, 2017). While 
media outlets are often quick to jump on such headline-making stories, until conclusive 
evidence is provided, these claims have so far been unfounded, and can therefore not (yet) be 
regarded as credible attempts at providing leverage. While Montenegro’s recent joining of 
NATO has occurred in relative peace, Russia’s ‘intimidating’ rhetoric in response to it suggest 
that future endeavors eastward may spark a more serious reaction, similar to what has recently 
been observed in Moldova38 (Vlahovic, 2017).  
 There are, however, also alternative considerations which must be taken into account 
in light of these increased linkages. With the EU future of the Western Balkans remaining ever-
so uncertain in the wake of the EU’s enlargement fatigue, the danger of an anti-Western 
rhetoric is at its strongest. While a few years ago, the Russian view of the EU as an institution 
that is “overlarge” and “crippled by process” had little substance for many of the Western 
Balkan states, many of these “perceptions and prejudices” have gained a credible foundation 
in the wake of the global financial crash and the subsequent Euro-crisis (Lo, 2015, p. 182). 
Considering that the distribution of information via various pro-Russian media outlets remains 
a tool of influence for Russia, its capability for spreading its anti-European (NATO and EU) 
views can help stimulate the development of more anti-European factions in the region (IISS, 
                                                
38 For more on this see Beyer & Wolff, 2016 
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2017). As has become clear, its position vis-à-vis populations of Eastern Orthodox and/or 
Slavic background can increase the credibility of the messages spread, working to the 
disadvantage of European institutions. 
 A final important consideration, is the significance of the regional ethnic disputes in 
relation to Russia’s linkages with the Slavic and Eastern Orthodox communities of the Western 
Balkans. While it is extremely unlikely that Russia is seeking to disrupt a fragile regional 
stability, based on unconsolidated identities, theories do exist regarding the benefits that the 
maintenance of a “fragile status quo” can provide (Lebanidze, 2014). A form of countering 
democracy promotion, employing such a mechanism is not new for Russia, as Jakob Tolstrup 
(2009) and Bidzina Lebanidze (2014) have both identified similar mechanisms in former Soviet 
Republics, where Russia has actively sought to counter Western influences. With states such 
as Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro remaining heavily politically divided along the 
different ethnic identities that make up their constituencies, Russia can retain a position of 
influence through the support of opposition parties. By empowering these groups, Russia 
contributes to maintaining a  “fragile status quo”, which subsequently can work to its advantage 
in two ways: first, political instability, such as that in Macedonia, makes “democratization a 
secondary issue for political elites as well as for the public, who typically opt to solve security 
issues first” (Lebanidze, 2014, p. 212); and secondly, Western actors involved in these states 
“are forced to focus more on stabilization and state-building measures” rather than on 
developing democratization and thus progress towards ‘Europeanization’ (Lebanidze, 2014, p. 
212).  
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Conclusion	
 
As this thesis has come to illustrate, in the period of Putin’s most recent presidency, 
Russia has managed to extensively reinforce historical linkages while also fostering new ones 
in the Western Balkans. A volatile region, the Western Balkans have gained strategic resonance 
for Russia in the wake of NATO and the EU’s intended eastward expansion. Whereas eastward 
expansion gives the region strategic resonance, it has been Europe’s ‘enlargement fatigue’ that 
has in fact exposed a political vacuum, leaving space for other external actors to increasing 
their regional influence. While Russia’s tactic has thus far been characteristic of a ‘soft power’ 
approach, outside several unfounded claims of substantial influence, it has yet to engage in 
more significant application of leverage to openly challenge NATO, and the EU. Its substantial 
reinforcement of historical linkages with the Slavic and Eastern Orthodox populations has 
however have shown its intent at preventing the complete Westernization of the Western 
Balkans, leaving the possibility of a harder approach open to the future. The case studies 
chosen, Montenegro, the Republic of Macedonia (FYR), and the entity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, have each presented an example of Russia’s increasing 
linkages, while also representing a clear illustration of the ethnic divisions that characterize 
this region.  
Montenegro, though arguably the furthest in its path towards becoming a consolidated 
democracy and a part of Europe, continues to struggle with issues of governance, of political 
participation, and without a doubt remains divided along ethnic lines. Although Russian 
linkages are arguably fairly strong in Montenegro (with special regards to its economy), its 
NATO integration, other than an increasingly aggressive rhetoric and a thus far unfounded 
claim of a Russian-backed plot to overthrow the government, Montenegro’s integration seems 
to have taken place without an overwhelming application of leverage. However, given the 
growing tensions between Montenegrin and Serb factions, in addition to the increasingly 
skeptical public opinion of its citizens, Russia’s strong grip over the Montenegrin economy 
must be taken seriously going forward, as its capabilities for exerting leverage remain 
comparatively strong in the small Balkan state.   
Macedonia has presented itself as a more complex case. Historically not a particular 
area of Russian interests, increased linkages with Russia as of recent have made Macedonia 
increasingly vulnerable to Russian influence. Specifically, the highly contentious topic of the 
Macedonian identity has shown itself as an issue susceptible to such influence. Its institutional 
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weakness, and notable backtracking toward more authoritarian ways are important 
considerations in this matter as well. If for example it’s NATO integration prospects were to 
be realized, the likelihood that Russia will step up its efforts to block these processes remains 
fairly substantial. The linkages established so far can provide it with a reasonable position of 
leverage with the Slavic Macedonians, although the strength of these ties, in comparison to the 
influence of the EU, remains to be seen. 
The third and final case, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its entity, Republika Srpska 
(RS), is arguably the most complex case of the three. Highlighting a broader division within 
the Balkans, the strong division in the Bosnian state between those of Muslim and Croat 
ethnicity with the Slavic and Serbs remains one most fundamental issues preventing its 
development toward becoming a functioning democracy, and a toward becoming a part of 
Europe. Boasting close ties, Russia’s unique position with Republika Srpska could prove to be 
a tremendous challenge to overcome for Western European states. Republika Srpska, with its 
Serb majority, has been illustrative of the continuing emphasis of Russia on a common history 
of Eastern Orthodox and Slavic traditions, and with that, Russian interests are arguably best 
served by the fragile separation of ethnicity in Bosnia. As long as Republika Srpska can provide 
a trident anti-European voice, and Serbs continue to look towards Russia as its most important 
ally, the future integration of Bosnia will remain but a faint hope, much to the advantage of 
Russia’s interests. 
 
Future	Research	
 
While this thesis has sought to create a more general overview of Russian linkages in 
the Western Balkans, future research could build upon the ideas presented here in a number of 
ways. While this study has been conducted based on three cases, a possibility exists for a more 
intricate analysis of a single case; allowing for a more in-depth analysis based on the ideas 
presented here, given that outside of Serbia, very little research has been done regarding the 
role of Russia in the Western Balkans. Another possibility for future research would be to look 
more closely at the factor of ethnicity alone, and it interrelate with Russia’s interests. As this 
thesis has shown, Slavism and Eastern Orthodoxy play an important role in Russia’s connection 
to the region. Each case presented here has represented a national division of ethnicity, and 
further investigation regarding the political and/or preferences of these groups could give better 
insight regarding the extent to which Russia can appeal to their interests, at the benefit of its 
own. 
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